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COMMENTARY / 40 YEARS OF TAX NOTES

By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
In 2012 Tax Notes will celebrate the 40th anniversary of its inaugural issue, published on September
18, 1972. In recognition of that milestone and to
show its appreciation for your continued readership, Tax Notes will be republishing select archived
articles from each of the past 40 years. Tax Notes
hopes that readers will enjoy these valuable contributions from prominent members of the tax community on issues that were and are of central
importance to the field. Readers are invited to
submit their own recommendations for our retrospective to taxnotes@tax.org, along with a short
explanation for why the article has been recommended.
This article was originally published on March
15, 1993. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School.
In the article Avi-Yonah proposed that the
United States tax multinational corporations using
a formulary apportionment system based solely on
income derived from sales. The background for the
article was drawn principally from Robert Reich’s
The Work of Nations (1991), and the analysis was
inspired by Stanley I. Langbein’s work on transfer
pricing, especially his seminal article ‘‘The Unitary
Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length,’’ Tax Notes,
Feb. 17, 1986, p. 625; see also Louis Kauder, ‘‘Intercompany Pricing and Section 482: A Proposal to
Shift From Uncontrolled Comparables to Formulary Apportionment Now,’’ Tax Notes, Jan. 25, 1993,
p. 485.

The current U.S. international tax rules are
largely a product of the 1950s, with the last major
changes enacted in 1962. These rules reflect a world
in which the American economy accounted for over
40 percent of the world’s GDP and U.S. multinational corporations dominated world trade. The
United States was the world’s largest creditor, its
balance of trade was overwhelmingly favorable,
and no other country could come close. Germany
and Japan were devastated by war, and Japanese
products were so suspect that Japan allegedly
named an island ‘‘Sweden’’ so that it could place on
its products the label ‘‘made in Sweden.’’
The major U.S. multinationals were clearly
American corporations. They imported raw materials, but the vast majority of their manufacturing
activity was performed in the United States by
well-paid production workers. Profits were
achieved by churning out high volumes of quality
TAX NOTES, June 4, 2012

goods that were sold all over the world bearing
unmistakably American trademarks. What was
good for G.M. was good for America: American
CEOs were seen, and to a degree behaved, as
corporate statesmen responsible for balancing the
interests of their shareholders, employees, and consumers.
Against this background, U.S. international tax
policy was based on a compromise between two
principles: capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality. Capital export neutrality meant that
American multinationals should not be given an
incentive to invest abroad rather than at home, or
vice versa. Therefore, U.S. multinationals had to be
subject to tax on their worldwide income, unlike the
policy adopted by some other countries (whose
multinationals were far less dominant worldwide)
of exempting foreign-source income in an effort to
bolster the competitiveness of their multinationals.
Foreign corporations, on the other hand, were taxed
only on income that was effectively connected with
a U.S. trade or business or otherwise derived from
U.S. sources (IRC section 11(d)).
However, capital import neutrality meant that
U.S. corporations should not be subject to more
onerous taxation on their foreign-source income
than their foreign competitors. If all income earned
abroad were taxed currently under capital export
neutrality principles, U.S. multinationals would be
subject to both U.S. and foreign taxes while the
competition, based in a country that exempted
foreign-source income, was subject only to local
taxation. Therefore, at the urging of the multinationals, American corporations were generally allowed to defer U.S. taxation until their foreign
earnings were repatriated.
The remaining basic principles of the U.S. international tax scheme, in all its stupendous complexity, can largely be derived from these basic
principles and policies. Because American corporations are taxed on their worldwide income, in order
to avoid multiple taxation of the same income it is
necessary to give them a credit for foreign taxes. But
since the United States is unwilling to subsidize
foreign governments by crediting taxes that are
higher than our own, the credit has to be limited to
the U.S. tax rate, based on a formula that gives
credit only to foreign-source income times the U.S.
tax rate (section 904). That, in turn, requires a
determination of what income is from sources
within and without the United States, and also
requires an elaborate ‘‘basket’’ system to prevent
taxpayers from manipulating their foreign income
to lower their overall foreign tax rate to the creditable U.S. rate (section 904(d)).
Because foreign corporations are taxed only on
their U.S.-source income, once again it is necessary
1229
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and (c) that the place of incorporation of the parent
corporation of a multinational is of fundamental
significance in distinguishing between U.S. and
foreign taxpayers. These assumptions are unrealistic because in an increasingly globalized economy,
there is no single source of income and separate
accounting for each unit of a multinational is impossible. A multinational corporation, no matter
where its headquarters are located, derives its income from its entire worldwide operations, and the
income cannot be either traced to a particular
geographic source or divided up by separate accounting among the various subsidiaries making
up the multinational. An attempt to do so is, as
Justice Brennan said in the Container case, like
‘‘slicing a shadow.’’
Moreover, in a globalizing economy, the identity
of multinationals as ‘‘domestic’’ or ‘‘foreign’’ based
on their place of incorporation is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Multinationals recruit their executives and employees from a worldwide pool and
locate their economic activities on the basis of
economic, not national, considerations. As Robert
Reich puts it, in the global economy, it is becoming
ever harder to determine ‘‘who is us.’’
Both capital export neutrality and capital import
neutrality, as presently implemented, are based on
these unrealistic assumptions. Capital export neutrality assumes that it can be determined if income
is foreign or domestic source, so as to be neutral
between the sources. Capital import neutrality assumes that it can be determined that two taxpayers
derive income from the same source, so as to be
neutral between the taxpayers. Moreover, both
theories place a strong emphasis on the presumed
identity of the taxpayer as U.S. or foreign. Worldwide taxation of income applies only to U.S. corporations, although the theory of capital export
neutrality would require worldwide taxation of all
corporations; otherwise, ‘‘foreign’’ corporations are
encouraged to invest outside the United States.
Capital import neutrality is based on the distinction
between U.S. and foreign taxpayers and the need to
preserve the competitiveness of U.S. multinationals
against their foreign counterparts.
What is an appropriate system for taxing such
multinationals in a world in which neither the
source of income nor the national identity of the
multinational can be determined? As many observers (including, e.g., Ronald Pearlman) have
argued, it is the system that is used by the states:
formulary apportionment of the entire worldwide
income of the multinational to the various taxing
jurisdictions. The states generally use a three-factor
formula of property, payroll, and sales. The first two
TAX NOTES, June 4, 2012
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to determine the source of income (sections 861865). Moreover, foreign corporations include corporations that are controlled by U.S. persons, and it is
considered too gross a violation of capital export
neutrality to permit such controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) to avoid current taxation on income
that would be taxed currently to a branch of a U.S.
corporation. Hence the ‘‘subpart F’’ rules, which
deny such deferral to some, but not all, foreignsource income earned by CFCs (sections 951-964).
Capital import neutrality, however, is implemented
in allowing deferral for other types of income
earned by CFCs.
The world has changed dramatically in the last
30 years, and particularly in the last decade. The
American economy now accounts for less than a
quarter of the world’s GDP, and U.S. multinational
corporations have to compete with larger foreign
multinationals, a competition in which many of
them are losing ground. The gross sales of the
biggest 350 multinationals amount to a third of
world GDP, more than the United States and more
than the entire Third World combined. The United
States is the world’s largest debtor, its balance of
trade is negative, and foreign investment in the
United States exceeds U.S. investment abroad. The
chairman of a major American manufacturer complains that American consumers prefer cars that
bear a Japanese trademark to identical cars that bear
an American name.
The major U.S. multinationals are fast losing their
‘‘American’’ character. While the majority of their
financing may still come from the United States,
their executives and employees are hired from a
worldwide pool and their manufacturing operations are spread all over the globe, wherever labor
costs are cheapest. The most successful ‘‘American’’
multinationals no longer depend for profit on high
volume but rather on the high value added by their
key employees, frequently in collaboration with
strategic partners from all over the globe. More and
more, ‘‘foreign’’ manufacturers are employing
Americans in larger numbers than ‘‘U.S.’’ corporations, making it close to impossible to tell whether a
product was ‘‘made in the U.S.A.’’ A Nissan Sentra
has more American-made parts than a Pontiac
LeMans.
These developments highlight the problematic
assumptions that underlie the current U.S. international tax system. These assumptions are (a) that it
is possible in most cases to determine the geographic source of an item of income, (b) that in the
case of a multinational corporation, it is possible to
allocate the income to each constituent unit of the
multinational based on a separate accounting of
such unit’s profit or loss and by treating transactions among units as if they were at arm’s length,
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In the international context, however, the threefactor formula used by the states is flawed, because
basing the tax on either payroll or assets creates
disincentives to corporate activities that the tax law
generally should encourage, i.e., hiring and investment. The starting point in choosing a formula for
allocating a multinational’s income among jurisdictions cannot be ability to pay (since the ability that
is determinative is that of the entire multinational,
not that of its unit in any jurisdiction), but rather the
benefits that the multinational derives from each
jurisdiction. As regards employment, a corporation
that employs workers pays for their services whatever they are worth on a consensual exchange basis,
so that, arguably, it gets as much as it gives.
However, the corporation is also, at the same time,
giving the worker valuable experience, and it cannot get full value for this benefit on a consensual
exchange basis because it usually cannot bind the
worker to her job, and she will take the experience
and training with her when she leaves. Therefore,
the training constitutes a ‘‘positive externality’’ that
confers a benefit on society in excess of what the
corporation receives in return. Thus, it is advisable
to base the formula on where services are rendered
by the corporation (and it is the recipient of the
positive externality), i.e., the sales factor, and not on
where they are rendered to the corporation.
With respect to the assets factor, the question is
more complicated. On a pure benefits analysis,
since the exchange of money for assets confers
equal benefits on buyer and seller, it may make
sense to have a formula that is based equally on
assets and sales (as suggested by Stanley Langbein
and others). However, there are at least three reasons to exclude assets from the formula.
First, if assets are included in the formula, multinational corporations would have a tax incentive to
invest in assets in jurisdictions where the tax rate is
lower. Such an incentive would violate capital export neutrality principles and the traditional rule
that taxation should be a neutral factor in economic
investment decisions, leading to inefficient allocations of global investments.
Second, the exclusion of assets is congruent with
the present emphasis on consumption over income
taxation for corporations, to induce them to invest
more in productive assets than is presently the case.
If the tax law should encourage corporations to
invest their retained earnings in productive assets
rather than distribute them or spend them on
corporate-level consumption, then it should not tax
TAX NOTES, June 4, 2012

corporations more heavily depending on how much
they invest in assets in the taxing jurisdiction.
Finally, the inclusion of assets leads to increased
complexity and potential for abuse. Assets are easily shifted between jurisdictions, so that corporations will have the ability to reduce their taxes
without real economic cost by moving assets within
the multinational. This situation is particularly severe in the case of valuable intangibles, such as
patents or trade secrets. Assets also pose severe
valuation problems, because a valuation based on
original book or tax cost may be obsolete and a
current market valuation of all assets is expensive
and hard to administer. Moreover, the rate of return
on many assets can vary dramatically from one
jurisdiction to another, so that including assets in
the formula and assuming an equal rate of return
would open it to the criticism that it distorts economic reality.
Therefore, the formula that I propose would
allocate taxable business income based solely on
sales. A market state has a right to tax the income
derived from exploiting its market, and the modern
theory of multinationals recognizes that multinationals mostly exist because of advantages derived
from controlling sales directly (as opposed to selling
through an unrelated distributor), such as the ability to control the quality of the product, prevent
trademark debasement, and avoid costless appropriation of information.
The proposed system would thus tax all affiliated
corporations, whether incorporated in the United
States or elsewhere, in the same manner; it would
take their worldwide income and multiply it by
U.S. sales over worldwide sales to produce the
income taxable in the United States. Note that the
formula applies to all affiliated corporations, on the
theory that common control is sufficient to establish
that each part of the overall business effectively
supports the other (at least in terms of its credit
rating). This avoids the cumbersome debate, which
has been waged on the state level, about what
constitutes a ‘‘unitary business.’’ Note also that the
formula does not distinguish between corporations
that happen to be incorporated in the United States
and corporations that happen to be incorporated
elsewhere. As stated above, such formalistic distinctions have little meaning in a globalized economy.
Finally, note that this is not a sales tax or a VAT; the
multinational is taxed on its overall income, which
is only allocated among jurisdictions on the basis of
sales. A multinational that is in a true loss position
worldwide would have no tax liability.
This system would create an advantage for multinationals that manufacture in the United States and
export abroad over multinationals that manufacture
1231
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factors represent the manufacturing capacity (capital and labor) that produces the income, and the
third represents the market from which the income
is derived.
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The proposed system also would lead to considerable simplification compared with the current
U.S. international tax rules. First, there would be no
need for sourcing income within and without the
United States, since all worldwide income would be
apportioned under the formula. Second, the foreign
tax credit would be abolished, because the United
States would tax only the portion of worldwide
income that is properly apportioned to it and
should not have to give credit for foreign taxes on
income that it does not tax. Third, subpart F of the
code could be abolished because there would be no
deferral; the United States would tax currently only
that proportion of worldwide income that is properly apportionable to it. Since the United States
would have already taxed all the income it had a
right to tax, subsequent dividends (as well as interest or royalties) paid within the corporate group
should be ignored and not be regarded as income.
In addition, the branch profits tax (section 884)
could be abolished (there would be no distinction
between a branch and a subsidiary), and international transfer pricing disputes under section 482
would become irrelevant (because all sales within a
multinational would be ignored).
There would, of course, be some complications
under the proposed system. First, sales would have
to be determined on a destination principle, similar
to that currently used for ‘‘foreign sales corporations’’ (sections 921-927), to prevent taxpayers from
manipulating the exemption based on ‘‘foreign’’
sales that are truly domestic. In principle, all sales of
intermediate goods whose ultimate consumers
(when incorporated into finished goods) are domestic should subject the seller to U.S. tax jurisdiction.
For example, a sale of raw materials that will be
incorporated into goods sold to consumers in the
United States should subject the seller to U.S. tax by
including those sales in the formula as U.S. sales,
even if the seller is unrelated to the ultimate seller in
the United States. In practice, because of administrability concerns, only direct and indirect sales of
finished goods into the U.S. market would be
counted, until a worldwide system of monitoring
and coordination can be set up.
1232

Second, the definition of ‘‘control’’ is important;
to prevent multinationals from avoiding taxation by
shifting income to formally unrelated intermediaries, the definition should be broad and flexible (like
the current rule under section 482) and not mechanical and formalistic. Such a broad definition
can more easily be adopted on a multilateral basis.
There are several major objections that can be
raised against the proposal. Some of them relate to
the administrative burden that formulary apportionment would impose on multinationals, which
would have to compile worldwide sales data using
U.S. GAAP and the U.S. dollar. These objections
seem to be exaggerated. Presumably, multinationals
today already have some idea of what their worldwide profit and loss accounts look like on a uniform
basis. Their objections to producing such records for
the IRS are more likely to stem from a desire to
avoid taxation than from bona fide concerns about
costs, and current law gives the IRS the means to
require foreign multinationals to produce the necessary information (sections 6038-6038C).
A more serious objection relates to the fact that
separate accounting (i.e., the arm’s length standard)
is the current international norm, so that the unilateral adoption of sales-based formulary apportionment by the United States will violate its treaty
obligations and (arguably) the GATT, and will lead
to retaliation, double taxation, and the distortion of
investment decisions and resulting loss of efficiency.
However, this objection also seems exaggerated.
First, in practice, most tax administrators use formulas even now, in the absence of true arm’s length
prices, which cannot, in most cases, be established
because of the absence of comparable transactions
between unrelated parties.
Second, it would seem to be possible to reach a
multilateral agreement similar to the Multistate Tax
Compact or the GATT. After all, the arm’s length
standard did not become the international norm
until the 1970s, with a lot of pressure from the
United States. A formula that emphasizes sales (or
‘‘source’’ taxation) would seem to favor most countries other than those with closed markets, especially less developed countries that are
disadvantaged by the current residence-based rules,
and a move to such a formula would thus be
relatively easy for most countries because it would
entail shifting the tax burden away from exporters
and onto importers (see appendix). It is no accident
that all European countries adopted a destinationbased VAT before any formal harmonization of VAT
began in Europe; a tax system that exempts exports
and is imposed on imports is generally popular,
even without prodding from above.
TAX NOTES, June 4, 2012
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abroad and import to the United States, thus providing an incentive to multinationals to do the
former rather than the latter (see appendix). It
would also preserve forms of both capital export
neutrality and capital import neutrality; an investment in the United States would not be advantaged
or disadvantaged compared to an investment
abroad, and all multinationals that sell in the United
States or outside it would be taxed on an equal
basis, whether they are considered to be ‘‘U.S.’’ or
‘‘foreign.’’
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would go up. This would provide an incentive for
the United Kingdom to also adopt the sales-only
formula, resulting in the following taxes:
1.3
USCo
UKCo
Total

U.S.

U.K.

Total

175,000
175,000
350,000

175,000
175,000
350,000

350,000
350,000

The resulting taxes would therefore be the same
as under the current system, except that the United
States would tax UKCo more heavily and the
United Kingdom would tax USCo more heavily
than at present.
B. U.S./Japan Model
Assume the same facts, except that the foreign
corporation is JapCo, a Japanese corporation with
property and payroll in Japan and all of its sales in
the United States, while USCo’s sales are half in the
United States and half in Japan. If both the United
States and Japan use the three-factor formula, the
taxes would be as follows:

Appendix: Effects of Single-Factor Sales Formula
A. U.S./U.K. Model
Currently, both the United States and the United
Kingdom tax on the basis of both manufacturing
and sales activity. Let us assume that such a tax is
roughly equivalent to a tax apportioned on the basis
of a three-factor property, payroll, and sales formula. USCo is a U.S. corporation with property and
payroll in the United States and sales half in the
United States and half in the United Kingdom.
UKCo is a British corporation with property and
payroll in the United Kingdom, and sales half in the
United Kingdom and half in the United States. If
USCo and UKCo both have taxable income of $1
million and the effective tax rate is 35 percent, then
the taxes to each jurisdiction would be as follows
(ignoring any foreign tax credits):
1.1
USCo
UKCo
Total

U.S.

U.K.

Total

291,667
58,333
350,000

58,333
291,667
350,000

350,000
350,000

If the United States unilaterally adopted a salesonly formula, the taxes would be:
1.2
USCo
UKCo
Total

U.S.

U.K.

Total

175,000
175,000
350,000

58,333
291,667
350,000

233,333
466,667

The U.S. revenue would not be affected, but
USCo’s taxes would go down and UKCo’s taxes
TAX NOTES, June 4, 2012

2.1
USCo
JapCo
Total

U.S.

Japan

Total

291,667
116,667
408,334

58,333
233,333
291,666

350,000
350,000

If the United States unilaterally adopts the singlefactor sales formula, the results would be:
2.2
USCo
JapCo
Total

U.S.

Japan

Total

175,000
350,000
525,000

58,333
233,333
291,666

233,333
583,333

The result is a rise in U.S. revenue and a decline
in USCo’s taxes, with a rise in JapCo’s taxes resulting from the double taxation imposed by Japan. If
Japan responded by moving to the single-factor
sales formula, the results would be:
2.3
USCo
JapCo
Total

U.S.

Japan

Total

175,000
350,000
525,000

175,000
0
175,000

350,000
350,000

This alleviates the burden on JapCo and raises
the taxes on USCo back to the right level, but at the
cost of reduced revenue to Japan. Therefore, Japan
should either open its markets more to USCo (so
that all of its sales are in Japan) or persuade JapCo
to sell more domestically.
This result applies even more forcefully if JapCo
sells all its products in the United States and USCo
1233
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Third, the formulary apportionment alternative
can be phased in gradually, e.g., initially by the
OECD, in which most multinationals are based and
whose members have increasingly similar tax systems. If the formula is adopted worldwide, it will
by definition not distort investment decisions (although differences in the tax base and effective
marginal tax rate will still influence investment
decisions), and can even encourage open markets
and free trade (see appendix).
In order to make such an agreement possible, the
United States should take the lead in proposing a
shift from the current system, toward a worldwide
formulary apportionment system for multinationals
on the basis of sales. While immediate, unilateral
action by the United States is not advisable because
it would violate treaty obligations, the United States
can and should give notice that it regards a shift to
sales-based formulary apportionment within a limited time as necessary to safeguard its legitimate tax
interests vis-à-vis multinational corporations, and
invite other countries to join it in moving to such a
system.
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2.4
USCo
JapCo
Total

U.S.

Japan

Total

350,000
116,667
466,667

0
233,333
233,333

350,000
350,000
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also sells all its products in the United States. In that
case the results under a three-factor formula are:

If the United States moves to a single-factor sales
formula, the result is a revenue gain for the United
States:
2.5
USCo
JapCo
Total

U.S.

Japan

Total

350,000
350,000
700,000

0
233,333
233,333

350,000
583,333

If Japan also moved to a single-factor sales formula:
2.6
USCo
JapCo
Total

U.S.
350,000
350,000
700,000

Japan

Total

0
0
0

350,000
350,000

In this case, Japan could only regain its revenue
by opening its market or by persuading JapCo to
sell domestically.
Overall, thus, the single-factor sales formula provides an incentive for countries with open markets
(the United States and the United Kingdom in the
example) to adopt it, because it maintains the same
revenue while shifting the burden from exporters to
importers. For countries with closed markets (Japan
in the example) that cannot retaliate by adopting
the same formula, it provides an incentive to open
their markets and to persuade domestic manufacturers to sell more at home.
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